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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to analyze the existence of the Tholiban Brigade movement in Tasikmalaya as a socio-
religious movement. The research aims to answer the existence, motives, and transformation of the Tholiban 
Brigade da'wah movement in the political field. The research was conducted through a qualitative approach 
through descriptive methods. Data collection was carried out through observation, interviews, and literature 
study. The results showed that the legalization of Islamic law in the state's formal law was carried out by 
the Tholiban Brigade to actualize Islamic da'wah towards Islamic daulah. The legalization of Islamic 
law is carried out in aspirations, participation, coalitions, and regional political bargaining. The motive of 
the Tholiban Brigade political da'wah movement is the spirit of amar maruf nahi munkar both in 
individual and social spheres. This is an effort to change the social order towards Islamic life as a whole 
(kaffah). The transformation of the da'wah movement towards the Brigade Tholiban political movement 
is based on religious teachings that view Islam as a religion and state. The implication of this research is 
expected to map the existence of the Tholiban Brigade political da'wah movement in the national political 
constellation. 
Keywords: da’wah movement; political movement; Brigade Tholiban; syariat Islam.  
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis eksistensi gerakan Brigade Tholiban di 
Tasikmalaya sebagai sebuah gerakan sosial keagamaan. Penelitian diarahkan pada upaya 
menjawab eksistensi, motif dan transformasi gerakan dakwah Brigade Tholiban dalam 
bidang politik. Penelitian dilakukan melalui pendekatan kualitatif melalui metode 
deskriptif. Pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui observasi, wawancara dan studi pustaka. 
Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa legalisasi syariat Islam dalam hukum formal negara 
dilakukan oleh Brigade Tholiban sebagai upaya aktualisasi dakwah Islam menuju daulah 
Islamiyyah. Legalisasi syariat Islam dilakukan dalam bentuk aspirasi, partisipasi, koalisi dan 
bargaining politik daerah. Motif gerakan dakwah politik Brigade Tholiban adalah spirit 
amar maruf nahi munkar baik pada lingkup individual maupun sosial. Transformasi 
gerakan dakwah menuju gerakan politik Brigadi Tholiban didasarkan pada doktrin ajaran 
agama yang memandang Islam sebagai agama dan negara. Implikasi penelitian ini 
diharapkan mampu memetakan eksistensi gerakan dakwah politik Brigade Tholiban dalam 
konstalasi politik nasional.  
Kata Kunci: gerakan dakwah; gerakan politik; Brigade Tholiban; syariat Islam.  
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INTRODUCTION 
After the fall of the New Order regime, religious movements' symptoms 
have returned to strength, both in the form of religious-based ideology, 
political movements, and acts of separatism. Reformasi was used as an 
expression of the pressure from the New Order regime for years. Reform 
is a pandora valve in expressing specific ideological ideas and movements. 
Phenomenon and symptoms of the strengthening of religious ideology 
occur not only in cities but also in regions, among the ideological groups 
in Islam that have returned to work in several areas in West Java, such as 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the 
Mujahidin Council (MM) and the Tholiban Brigade (BT). 
The Islamic ideological movement developed with various 
motivations, both with economic, political, and Islamic preaching motives. 
The Islamic ideological movement group is used as a political patron for 
regional leaders such as regents and mayors. There is a commitment 
between them to cultivate a symbiotic relationship with mutualism, as was 
done by the Tholiban (BT) Brigade in Tasikmalaya. As a religion-based 
ideological group, BT carries the jargon amar ma'ruf nahi munkar or 
da'wah. However, their da'wah methods and approaches tend to lead to 
extremism, which triggers pro and contra attitudes in society. It mainly 
refers to members of society who have a more gentle and moderate 
understanding and Islam approach. 
Reformation-era provided room for freedom of expression, freedom 
of the press, and freedom of association, which had long been suppressed 
by the New Order government. This situation continues to affect both 
urban and rural communities. The BT movement tends to be accepted by 
the Tasikmalaya people to develop and get reinforcement from various 
parties, especially the santri group. The BT movement was declared in 2006 
as a community organization in Tasikmalaya, which is officially named the 
Tholiban Brigade. 
The Tholiban Brigades have an essential role in playing local, regional 
politics. BT has succeeded in marketing their romantic ideas to be 
accommodated in the realm of positive law, such as the targets of Islamic 
ideas manifested in the form of Regional Regulations or Perda. The 
actualization of the BT group's Islamic ideals to become large, broadcast, 
and legal is carried out with various approaches, such as local politics, 
history, and religious sentiments. 
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The influence of the International Islamic movement and domestic 
politics is also thought to have contributed to the growth and development 
of religious, ideological groups in the regions. It is seen as a result of the 
development of infiltrated information technology in most Indonesians' 
lives, both in urban and rural areas. This influence can be seen from the 
domestic political constellation, which shows a tendency for BT 
movements and strategies to be more political in the general elections for 
legislative members, both at the central and regional levels. In the 2009 
Election, the Tasikmalaya Tholiban Brigade was recorded as having 
succeeded in the success of 1 representative in the Indonesian Parliament 
(DPR RI), one person in the Provincial (DPRD), and 21 people in the 
Tasikmalaya City (DPRD) (Hasani & Naipospos, 2010: 184). This political 
movement and strategy were carried out to achieve the target of the 
Tholiban Brigade Islamic ideas and ideals into a legal and readily accepted 
policy by the public. 
The democratization that was played 16 years ago provides more 
flexibility for groups like BT to collaborate and coalitions with regional 
leaders and support regional leadership candidates to get policy support 
that supports their movements. However, BT's ideas and movements have 
been shown to have provoked reactions from other groups and adherents 
of Islamic ideology that is more established and "non-political," such as the 
pesantren in Tasikmalaya. The reaction of this pesantren group is not 
limited to differences in approaches and methods of da'wah.  There are also 
differences in understanding of ethical concepts that originate in the Koran 
and the struggle for influence in society (Aripudin, 2013). 
The BT movement has several times carried out acts of mass 
mobilization and acts of violence against people who have violated religious 
ethics. For example, the Sweeping Action was carried out against 
nightclubs, liquor places, the arrest of community members who 
committed immoral acts, to political pressure on the local government to 
allow mining development and exploration which he considered tarnished 
the justice of the local community, as happened in the Central Panca 
district. These actions and actions were carried out as a concrete form of 
commitment by BT members that must be fought for Islamic values. 
The actions and actions of the BT group as above, are not the only 
goals of the BT movement, other agendas that cannot be separated from 
this group such as the issue of understanding Islamic philanthropy, both 
related to ways of consuming and distributing it, views on jihad and ways 
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of doing it, as well as an understanding of leadership concepts that must be 
actualized and applied in the lives of Muslims (Chandrasekaran, 2002). 
Besides, BT's view of an "Islamic state" seems to be one of the 
central ideas. It is related to how to maintain Islam and Muslims. In his 
view, to achieve the ideals of daulah Islamiyah, all Muslim community 
components must carry out the stages as done by Rasulullah in Mecca. One 
of them is related to applying and actualizing the concept of "hijrah," which 
is seen as the starting point in achieving an "Islamic state." BT also does 
not feel awkward about doing "political training" with the authorities or 
political figures to get "financial assistance." The strong ties of mass 
militancy serve as the reason that they have a large and influential mass. A 
small portion of their financial gain was distributed to BT members, while 
their leaders used the rest to build mosques, madrasahs, or majlis taklim 
(Interview with AS, April 2013). 
An important question related to BT'sBT's role and existence in 
Tasikmalaya is about how the process of actualizing the BT group's ideals 
to get broad support from the people of Tasikmalaya. The essential 
concepts he developed then gave birth to a communication network that 
regulates the relationship between them and outside their group to become 
a social movement with religious nuances. The re-strengthening of the 
"local religious" us" movement as"happened in Tasikmalaya is interesting 
to reveal because it has become a movement highlighted regarding its 
actions that have generated pros and cons. 
In this regard, the strengthening of social and political-religious 
movements after the 1998 New Order can be seen from several previous 
studies. Several studies have examined the relationship between dakwah 
and politics, for example, Rosa's (2014) research on the politics of da'wah 
and political da'wah in the reform era. This study analyzes the Dzikr 
Council, which is positioned as a da'wah entity by President SBY. The 
results showed that the Dzikr Nurussalam Council's existence as part of a 
socio-religious movement could not be separated from the political 
interests of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's interest group. Another research 
was conducted by Ja'far (2015), who analyzed the socio-religious 
movement of the Naqshabandiyyah Syekh Hasan Maksum Tarekat in 
North Sumatra. The study results concluded that the religious social 
movement of the tarekat has a significant influence on society. This 
influence is felt not only in the religious and social aspects, including in the 
political aspect. Nirwana's research (2016) analyzes the relationship 
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between politics and da'wah in Indonesia. The results show that power or 
politics is seen as having a significant role and being used as a medium in 
achieving Islamic preaching goals. 
Meanwhile, several studies that take the object of study of religious 
community organizations include Dodi (2017). The research took the 
object of the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII). It is concluded 
that the LDII organization has experienced a metamorphosis of a 
movement that is perceived as a heretical organization, becoming a socio-
religious movement with a new paradigm in the context of social, 
economic, cultural, and bureaucratic relations. Nugraha's research (2018) 
analyzes socio-religious movements based on economics. The research was 
conducted on BMT in Bandung Regency. The results showed that Muslim 
identity politics influenced the growing religious, economic movement in 
rural areas. This transformation occurs in strategic spaces such as economic 
and political interests. This conclusion is confirmed by Gunawan's research 
(2018), which states that society's social transformation is carried out to 
achieve the vision and mission of the movement, including related to 
religious, social movements. 
Muslim research (2019) analyzes the emergence of the Islamic 
Defenders Front (FPI). Since its emergence, FPI has often been considered 
controversial and radical in taking specific actions and actions. FPI's 
political relations have been considered intense since its involvement in the 
212 Action to Defend Islam (ABI) related to religious blasphemy. In its 
development, the FPI movement cannot be separated from radicalism and 
extremist movements' perceptions. Setiadi's research (2019) explores the 
phenomena of radical ideology, global jihad, and religious terrorism 
sprouted in Indonesia, even though socio-religious movements. This 
phenomenon is alleged to be the global implication of Muslim identity 
politics and infiltrate Islamic community organizations in Indonesia. It is 
concluded that acts of radicalism, global jihad, and terrorism directly impact 
religions and their adherents. These actions cannot be separated from the 
existence of specific political interests and powers. Kuswana's research 
(2020) analyzes the Brigade Tholiban group's ideological transformation in 
playing a role in power/politics. It was concluded that the Tholiban Brigade 
saw the importance of power to strengthen its Islamic ideas and ideals. 
The fundamental issues seem to still revolve around economic issues 
and da'wah. This potential got its momentum in the era of democracy and 
political freedom in post-reform Indonesia. The pre-existing socio-political 
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potential is also a potent trigger for the community. Community support, 
especially productive youth, is increasingly becoming a signal to young 
people's problems in life's increasingly complex and challenging. So 
significant is the re-emergence of religious movements in the regions that 
requires seriousness in overcoming it. The problem's breadth and 
complexity require more specific research and go to the heart of the 
problem. 
This study seeks to analyze social movements and political da'wah 
from the Tholiban Brigade group in Tasikmalaya. Research is based on the 
assumption that local religious movements have a decisive socio-political 
role and influence the surrounding communities. This local religious 
movement has strengthened since the reformation and after the fall of the 
New Order regime. This research object is all things related to social 
movements and the political da'wah of the Tholiban Brigade group in 
Tasikmalaya. It includes the objectives, driving factors, and transformation 
of the social movement into the Tholiban Brigade political movement. 
Meanwhile, this study's subjects were groups or community organizations 
of the Tholiban Tasikmalaya Brigade. This research uses a qualitative 
approach with descriptive study methods. These approaches and methods 
were chosen to explore, analyze, map, and describe the social movements 
and political da'wah of the Tholiban Brigade organization. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
The Existence of Political Da'wah Movement of Brigade Tholiban 
One of the most prominent and radical mass organizations in Tasikmalaya 
is the Tholiban Brigade. It can be seen from his actions in suppressing 
immoral behavior. The Tholiban Brigade is one of the organizations that 
carry out prevention and anti-immoral actions. The Tholiban Brigade was 
led by Ajengan Zenzen (late) from the Sulalatul Huda Tasikmalaya Islamic 
Boarding School. Ajengan Zenzen is known to have expertise in politics. 
As what happened on May 3, 2010, in the South Tasikmalaya region. 
After participating in the grand tabligh event at the Nurul Jaza 
Hegarmanah Islamic boarding school, Bantarkalong District, the Tholiban 
Brigade period carried out a sweeping liquor action Bantarkalong and 
Karangnunggal areas, South Tasikmalaya. They confiscated liquor bottles 
and lottery gambling sold installs (Aripudin, 2013). The Tholiban Brigade 
was born out of concern about the rampant immoral actions in Tasikmalaya 
after the 1998 reformation. Various obscenities were shown even near 
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places of worship. For example, the Great Tasikamalaya mosque area is 
often used as a place for prostitution and a place for drunkenness. They 
were responding to this situation Ajengan Zenzen together with KH. Asep 
Mousul Affandi gathered ajengan and ulama from various Islamic 
organizations to respond to this situation. 
They then agreed to form the Tasikmalaya Islamic Community 
Gathering Forum. This forum inspired and encouraged the birth of the 
Tholiban Brigade in 1999. After being founded, Tholiban established itself 
as an anti-immoral Islamic organization in Tasikmalaya. They are diligent 
in confronting various immoralities, such as gambling, prostitution, and 
liquor circulation. Tholiban is not just an anti-immoral Islamic 
organization. However, also struggling to uphold Islamic law. When this 
mass organization was established, the political situation in Tasikmalaya 
benefited them, significantly to push the agenda for motivating Islamic law 
into various regional regulations. 
In a political context, the Tholiban Brigade can build communication 
and coalitions with candidates for regents or mayors. It is a manifestation 
of Islamic politics (siyasah) to the success of regional sharia regulations. For 
example, in the 2007 elections for the city of Tasikmalaya, the Tholiban 
Brigade supported Syarif Hidayat as mayor. The mayor paid this support 
by issuing Perda no. 12/2009 concerning the Development of Social Values 
based on the Teachings of the Islamic Religion and the Social Norms of 
the City of Tasikmalaya People. 
In other cases, for example, in the 1999 elections, Islamic parties won 
significant votes. At that time, PKB won five seats, PAN four seats, PBB 
two seats, and PPP won 11 seats and won the election in Tasikmalaya. The 
Tholiban Brigade used this Islamic party's victory to push for regional 
regulations with Islamic law's nuances. Moreover, the Tholiban Brigade 
figures and other mass organization figures such as FPI have a particular 
affinity with Islamic parties. 
Efforts to enforce Islamic law are increasingly wide open after Tatang 
Farhanul Hakim, Chairperson of PPP party in Tasikmalaya was elected as 
Regent of Tasikmalaya in 2001. This opportunity was used as a momentum 
to achieve the missionary vision of the Tholiban Brigade and FPI. In this 
case, the formulation of the Vision and Strategic Plan (Restra) of the 
Tasikmalaya Regency received full attention from the Tholiban Brigade. 
The preparation of this strategic plan refers to PP. 108/2000, which states 
that each district or city must have a strategic plan as a reference in 
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development. Practically, the Tholiban Brigade, together with Islamic 
organizations and Islamic parties, demanded the substance of Islamic law 
ideas in the strategic plan. 
The 2001-2005 Tasikmalaya District Strategic Plan as outlined in 
Perda No. 13/2001 states that the vision of Tasikmalaya Regency as a 
district "which is religious / Islamic puts itself into a developed district in 
West Java in 2010". The Regent of Tasikmalaya, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, 
also issued a circular with Islamic law's nuances. For example, Circular No. 
451 / SE / Sos / 2001 concerning Efforts to Improve the Quality of Faith 
and Faith. In 2003 this vision was revised by Regulation No. 13/2003, 
where the vision was changed to "Tasikmalaya which is religious / Islamic 
as a district that is advanced and prosperous and competitive in the field of 
business pastimes in West Java (Setda Kab. Tasikmalaya, 2010). 
The birth of radical mass organizations such as the Tholiban Brigade 
and the FPI cannot be separated from their leaders, often called the ajengan 
bendo groups. Most of them have a relationship with the Miftahul Huda 
Islamic Boarding School or what is often referred to as the Manonjaya 
Islamic Boarding School. The figures include Ajengan Zenzen from the 
Sulalatul Huda pesantren, Ajengan Asep Mausul from the Miftahul Huda 
Islamic Boarding School Ajengan Mubin, an alumnus of the Manonjaya 
Islamic boarding school. 
Pesantren Manonjaya is known as a traditional pesantren which has 
specific characteristics. Most of his fiqhiyyah teachings were based on the 
Shafi'i school of thought. Shafi'i is one of the four great traditions of Islamic 
fiqh in Sunni Islam in the world. Members of the Nahdlatul Ulama refer to 
themselves as ahlus sunnah wal jama'ah, but the idea of enforcing Islamic 
law has long been growing in this pesantren. This statement is 
understandable because this pesantren was founded by Khoer Affandi, a 
DI (Darul Islam) figure in Tasikmalaya. Many figures and alumni are active 
in practical politics, such as Asep Mousul and Ajengan Mubin, both at the 
local and national levels. They co-founded the Indonesian Mujahidin 
Council (MMI) in August 2000 (Naipospos, 2010). 
According to one informant (AA, interview, 18 September 2013), the 
number of members of the Tholiban Brigade was estimated at 6,000 
people. Most of its members are students of the Miftahul Huda Islamic 
boarding school, Sulalatul Huda, and its networks, such as the Nurul Jaza 
Islamic Boarding School, in South Tasikmalaya. Many of his students 
joined the Santri Regiment (RESAN) and the Tasikmalaya Solidarity of 
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Muslims (TSM) who were involved in the sweeping action with the 
Tholiban Brigade. Pesantren became the mass base of the Tholiban Brigade 
mass organization. 
In the context of regeneration, the Tholiban Brigade organization 
can be followed by anyone. The general public can join this organization. 
There is no special recruitment in the process of legalizing membership of 
the Tholiban Brigade. Culturally, joining the community to the Brigade 
Tholiban organization usually begins with participation in Thursday night 
recitation at the Miftahul Huda Islamic Boarding School. Also, not a few 
joined this organization through direct involvement in raids or sweeping 
immorality. Most of those who expressed interest in joining the Tholiban 
Brigade, from among the general public were former thugs who had either 
converted or repented. These former thugs were used by this organization, 
especially in actions and actions related to immorality. 
Based on their motivation, most Tholiban Brigade members stated 
that they were participating because they wanted to carry out Amar ma'ruf 
nahi munkar. However, not a few of the members stated that they were just 
"hitchhiking" or wanted to take shelter behind the Tholiban Brigade's 
greatness. Some even have political motivations, where their participation 
in this organization aims to take advantage of the greatness and influence 
of Ajengan Zenzen and Asep Mousul. Meanwhile, in fostering members, 
the Tholiban Brigade organization routinely provides spiritual training and 
training. It is done mainly in recitation, which is done every Thursday night 
at the Miftahul Huda Islamic boarding school. 
Besides, routine recitation as a form of member guidance is carried 
out every month. The implementation is carried out in turns at the place or 
secretariat of the leadership in the Tholiban Brigade branches. Usually, this 
coaching is directly carried out by Ajengan Zenzen. Apart from spiritual 
training, members of the Tholiban Brigade also receive physical training in 
martial arts and karate training. It is done as a form of provision and 
preparation for physical preparedness, especially in carrying out actions or 
measures to prevent disobedience. 
Most people perceive the Tholiban Brigade's existence as a da'wah 
movement as a radical movement that carries out da'wah patterns in a 
problematic way. Actions and actions such as sweeping the place of 
immorality, dissolving gambling places, and dimly lit stalls, prohibiting 
alcoholic beverages, and so on, have resulted in various community 
responses. The pros and cons of community support for the Tholiban 
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Brigade movement have become polemic and debated. In this case, Poston 
(1991) classifies missionary philosophies of Muslims into two forms, 
namely defensive-pacifist and offensive-activist da'wah. These two patterns 
indicate Islam's effort, which is related to the relationship between da'wah, 
jihad, and practice in religion (Fikri, 2014: 55). 
Da'wah is oriented as an effort to create an ideal society. Namely, a 
social order with strong monotheism, a complete foundation of faith, and 
noble practice by the foundation of faith. The da'wah management carried 
out by Rasulullah Saw is guided by the main da'wah book, al-Quran, which 
teaches how important it is to do Amar maruf and nahi munkar by paying 
attention to segmentation and the needs of the object of da'wah (madh'u). 
The examples of preaching that Rasulullah Saw did were varied. Rasulullah 
always pays attention to his object's condition, social background, level of 
knowledge and skills, economic status, including in terms of developing 
strategies (siyasah) or his da'wah politics (Rustandi & Sahidin, 2019: 363-
364). 
It is feared that radical actions and actions have the potential to give 
birth to acts of terrorism. It is based on the doctrine of understanding about 
da'wah's obligation, which must be accompanied by the necessity of jihad. 
The radical terrorism movement's potential is suspected as a condition that 
is seen as oppression, injustice, and injustice (Setiadi, 2020: 4). In this case, 
the Tholiban Brigade's appearance, as conveyed by the informant, was 
based on conditions that displayed the moral degradation of Muslims in 
Tasikmalaya—starting from the desire to change the moral order of society, 
so that the existence of the Tholiban Brigade requires the support of the 
movement's formal legality and regulation, especially from policymakers in 
Tasikmalaya.  
The Socio-Historical Motive of the Tholiban Brigade  
The 1996 riots that caused physical damage in Tasikmalaya often became 
the spirit of the emergence of potential socio-religious dynamics in people's 
lives. The history of religious movements with political nuances in 
Tasikmalaya had happened long before, namely during the struggle for the 
DI / TII movement in 1949, which was proclaimed by the figure S.M. 
Kartosuwirjo, a young man from Central Java who later married a 
Sundanese girl (Dengel, 2011). 
Another movement was Komando Jihad (Komji) from 1976-1980 in 
various regions, such as Sumatra, West Java, Central Java, to East Java. 
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Komando Jihad was driven by Ismail Pranoto in Sumatra, while in West 
Java, it was moved by Warman. Various actions and events involving this 
group, such as terror, robbery, bombing, and murder. The Komji 
movement also occurred in Tasikmalaya and subsided by the 1980s 
(Mubarak, 2008: 76-77). 
The series of events of the Islamic movement above, it seems, is still 
challenging to eliminate in Tatar Priangan. It is due to various facts and 
reasons that can grow in society so that they reappear in the present era 
after a long period of political closure during the Old Order and New Order 
periods. The emergence of the Tholiban Brigade movement in Tasikmalaya 
cannot be separated from the socio-historical ties that have helped maintain 
and strengthen the Islamic ideological movement's potential, which is full 
of political power movements. The Islamic ideological movement takes the 
spirit of da'wah as a motive for spreading and implementing Islam in 
people's lives. It can be seen from the way and targets of the movement. 
The spirit of preaching that is carried out is oriented to personal change 
and seeks to build change in the context of the state. 
Based on the opinion, mass actions, and movements, the Tholiban 
Brigade was born because of several Islamic figures' anxiety in Tasikmalaya. 
This anxiety is mainly related to the rampant behavior violations of ethics 
and religious norms in society. This phenomenon is strengthened by the 
deviation of social behavior from the younger generation, both in the form 
of immoral acts, crime, and other youthful delinquencies such as narcotics, 
alcohol, free sex, etc. Besides, the clashes that often occur between thuggish 
groups in society. It led to the emergence of socio-religious movements 
such as the Tholiban Brigade. Ideologically, the Tholiban Brigades have 
similarities with the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) movement in Egypt, the 
Hamas movement in Palestine, and the Islamic Taliban movement in 
Afghanistan (Chandrasekaran, 2012). Where these Islamic movements are 
formed to ensure the application of Islamic rules in people's lives. The spirit 
of da'wah, which is used as a motive for the movement, is oriented towards 
transforming society both from the individual and communal side. What 
distinguishes these Islamic movements are the efforts, processes, and 
methods undertaken to actualize their da'wah goals. 
According to one informant (D, interview September 2, 2013) stated 
that the difference between the Tholiban Brigade movement in 
Tasikmalaya and the Middle East Taliban movement is the strengthening 
of Islamic da'wah, which is oriented towards achieving the organization's 
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mission, namely "informing about Islam and warning Muslims who have 
come to the truth. to him". His obsession is to Islamize, especially the rulers 
who behave wrongly. The basic concept in achieving its goal is to try to 
shift society's existence from ignorance towards knowledgeable, 
thoughtful, and insightful people. So, in the end, it can be implemented as 
a hope in a real manifestation guided by the concept of Islam in a 
comprehensive manner (Nuansa Post, accessed January 1, 2012). 
Ajengan Zenzen (now the late) leader of the Sulalatul Huda Islamic 
Boarding School as BT is known to be good at politics. He did not hesitate 
to form a coalition with candidates for mayor and regent in passing regional 
sharia regulations, as happened in 2007. Some of his cadres passed to 
Senayan, such as Asep Mausul, who is also the Miftahul Huda Islamic 
Boarding School leader who became a member of the Indonesian 
Parliament from the PPP Party (Hasani & Naipospos, 2010: 183-184). 
Besides, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, head of PPP Tasikmalaya Regency, 
became regent in 2001. When Tatang Farhanul Hakim served as Regent of 
Tasikmalaya, he issued circular letters nuanced with Islamic law, such as 
Circular No. 451 / SE / Sos2001 / concerning efforts to improve the 
quality of faith and piety. 
In a global context, the Tholiban Brigade is often perceived as a 
network of radical movements worldwide. BT is considered an extension 
of the Taliban, IM, and Hamas movement. This perception has been 
challenged, as expressed by Ruhanudin, Head of BT Kab. According to 
him, Tasikmalaya that the Tasikmalaya Tholiban Brigade movement has no 
connection with the Taliban in Afghanistan or Pakistan. However, the 
ideological principles have in common, which are not much different from 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Hamas movement in Palestine 
and other Islamic movements. As expressed by it, the difference is in 
actualizing the goal and the way of expressing it. 
"Unlike the Taliban in the Middle East, a large organization that has 
gone far into the political arena, the Tholiban Tasikmalaya movement 
is still limited to preaching Islamiyah according to its mission, which 
is" to inform about Islam and warn Muslims who have come to the 
truth to him (interview results in October 2013). " 
Meanwhile, regarding the concept of leadership, which is used as 
BT's missionary mission, Ruhanudin believes that there are no leaders in 
Indonesia who indeed carry a mandate. It can be said that all of them are 
more dominant in selfishness than paying attention to the community's 
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interests. Ruhanudin took the role of a leader, such as Ayatollah Khomeini 
when he led Iran. According to him, a leader should be modest and far 
from being mundane. On this basis, BT is of the view that it is necessary 
to believe the leader of injustice, which is one of the objectives of the 
Tholiban Brigade's mission. 
Practically, the Tholiban Brigade's strategy in achieving its mission is 
carried out through da'wah activities that seek to provide understanding to 
the community. Every Tholiban Brigade member carries out the 
community propagation movement strategy through da'wah sir or door to 
door. 
"Currently, Tholiban Tasikmalaya is only concerned with 
monitoring, because to boost a moral crisis, it is necessary to have a 
combination of thoughts and understandings that are the same with 
society. Therefore, to achieve its goals, the Taliban, which currently 
has a membership of approximately 6,000 people and spreads in 
remote areas of Tasikmalaya, moves from conveying understanding 
to the public through da'wah, which is carried out silently or arguably 
guerrilla door-to-door "da'wah sir" (Results of an interview with the 
US, 19 May 2014). 
So far, the Tholiban Brigade political da'wah movement has been 
carried out by participating in the contestation of democracy through a 
coalition support process with legislative or executive candidates who have 
the potential to win. It is proven by their involvement in several political 
moments, such as Pilwalkot Tasikmalaya, Pilbup Tasikmalaya, and General 
Elections in 1999 and 2009. For the Tholiban Brigade organization, their 
involvement in political movements is an integrative part of Islamic da'wah. 
It refers to BT's preaching spirit in building community change. One of the 
concrete proofs of BT political training's success is the birth of several 
Sharia Regional Regulations in Tasikmalaya. Meanwhile, to get involved 
directly in the practical political arena, most of the BT members stated that 
it was not time to "enter the political stage" directly.  
"Not yet, but if you look at the reality of the behavior of the rulers 
who are corrupt and abuse the people and deviate from the Islamic 
concept, there is a possibility that this could happen." Furthermore, 
he said that at this time, he was moving to build understanding and 
moral strength of the community in aqidah and worship system 
based on Islamic rules based on the sentence tawhid La ilaaha illallah 
(there is no god other than the real God) "(R, Chairman of BT Kab. 
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Tasikmalaya, 2013).  
It was confirmed by another informant (KK, interview November 
2013) that according to him: 
"Currently, there is not enough strength to go further, so we do it 
with da'wah. We are gathering positive public opinion about the 
Taliban's mission to be used as energy to achieve goals. Sometimes 
in the face of the government authorities' arrogant attitude, they are 
constrained by the hypocritical religious figures lining up behind 
them. They do not flinch despite seeing that there are deviations 
because they have been supplied in the world. We will see how we 
will do jihad. "Dalam hal ini, jihad dapat diartikan sebagai 
mencurahkan usaha, kemampuan, dan tenaga. Jihad berarti 
menanggung kesulitan. Dalam Alquran kata jihad disebut 34 kali 
(Qardhawi, 2010).  
Jihad, which is understood to be synonymous with the mobilization 
of physical force, seems to be carried out by the BT organization. Another 
accusation states that BT has close ties with Jamaah Islamiah (JI) in 
Indonesia. The similarity of ideology is a fundamental reason for the 
relationship between the two Islamic movements. BT figure Ruhanuddin 
explained about the understanding of the concept of the movement carried 
by each group. He explained that Tholiban Tasikmalaya, like other Islamic 
movements, was in opposition to the government, but in the concept of 
the movement, it was more social humanity. Perhaps it is different from 
the Taliban in Afghanistan or other Islamic movements oriented towards 
fadhoil (worship) so that their movements appear radical. It could have 
happened one day with the Tasikmalaya Taliban if only the morality of the 
rulers had gone beyond the limit. 
That is the existence of Tholiban Tasikmalaya, an Islamic movement 
organization that is currently struggling during the human moral decline. 
His movement is considered to be coloring political performance in this 
country. The above statement does not appear to be a new issue, but it has 
existed since before independence regarding whether the state should be 
based on Islamic teachings or Islam should occupy the same position as 
other religions in Indonesia. This debate arose during the Soekarno regime 
in debates over the agreement in the Jakarta Charter. As a social movement, 
the Tholiban Brigade's existential motive is based on a sense of the same 
fate, a common enemy, and a common goal. This motive gives birth to a 
collective identity, which in turn will have an impact on the response from 
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the surrounding environment. This collective identity strengthens common 
goals in responding to challenges, strengthens social solidarity, and forms 
sustainable social interactions (Setiadi, 2019: 23). 
The Tholiban Brigade identifies itself as a political da'wah movement 
with a specific orientation. The spirit of da'wah inherent in this organization 
becomes the motive for the movement that underlies the movement's 
patterns and methods. Therefore, the Tholiban Brigade can be viewed as a 
socio-religious movement with an agenda of change in the context of local 
political, regional movements. In this case, the aspirations, participation, 
coalitions, and political training carried out by the Tholiban Brigade are 
oriented towards achieving Islamic da'wah's goals. Robert Misel states that 
social movements are a set of non-institutionalized beliefs and actions 
carried out by a group of people to promote or hinder change in society 
(Rafiudin, 2020: 74). The strength of the Tholiban Brigade as a socio-
religious movement lies in the movement's doctrine, which is based on 
Islamic values. 
The Transformation of the Tholiban Brigade's Political Da'wah 
There is an idea expressed that “tong pareum ideologi NII lamun hayang negakeun 
syareat Islam di Indonesia. Teu kudu make payung hukum engke oge bakal aya 
sorangan, langkahna kuatken tauhid ka masyarakat ku kalimat laa ilaha illallah” 
(If you want to uphold Islamic law, then do not let the ideology of the NII 
dim. There is no need to use a legal umbrella, because later it will also 
emerge by itself, by strengthening community tauhid) (KK informant, 
interview, 28 April 2013). 
The spirit of the da'wah movement (religious ideology), which 
manifested itself in the Tholiban Brigade, did not appear to be limited to 
the fall of the New Order regime and the emergence of the 1998 
reformation. The seeds of the Tholiban Brigade movement's religious 
ideology have their roots ingrained in the body of the NII ideologies. The 
idea and desire to implement Islamic law are deeply ingrained in the 
Tholiban Brigade followers' souls. BT can be said to be a post-New Order 
"Neo-NII." We can see this in the presence of formal juridical facts that 
reinforce this trend. For example, the aspirations of the community related 
to sharia regulations. Where the Tasikmalaya government and the DPRD 
officials responded to this by issuing Regional Regulations, which were the 
substance of the Shari'at Perda. The hope is that this regional regulation 
aims to create an order in the life of the people of Tasikmalaya, which is 
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dignified and has a noble character. The orientation of this regulation is 
based on the principles of Islamic teachings, noble values , and norms that 
grow and develop in society while adhering to the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Archives of the Regional Government of 
Tasikmalaya Regency, 2009). 
If we look at it, there are several main objectives in the formulation 
of this regional regulation, including: first, to create public awareness and 
understanding of the importance of social values and norms as a guide for 
life, both for personal life and in the life of society, nation, and State. 
Second, building public understanding of the consequences of behavior 
and actions that deviate and contradict the Islamic religion's teachings and 
social norms and legal regulations, both for personal life, family, 
community, and nation and State. Third, forming a personality for the 
Muslim community with akhlakul karimah, which is rooted in Al-Quran 
and As-sunah. 
Fourth, forming a person who is not a Muslim to respect and respect 
the Islamic religious teachings of the majority of the Tasikmalaya people 
and the social norms and legal regulations that apply in Indonesia. Fifth, 
creating increased faith and devotion for Muslims to Allah SWT. Sixth, 
creating an atmosphere of community life and an environment that is 
harmonious, harmonious, peaceful, safe, orderly, and serene (Perda 
Tasikmalaya, 2009). 
Furthermore, this regional regulation emphasizes the basic principles 
of social life based on Islamic teachings. This basic principle is binding on 
all Tasikmalaya people, both those who live permanently or not. In practical 
terms, the implementation of this regulation is oriented towards building 
values for social life where every Muslim is obliged to always uphold the 
glory of the teachings of Islam, which are derived from the Koran and as-
sunnah as demands and guidelines for life, both in an individual and 
communal context. 
The spirit of Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar and rahmatan lil Alamin is a 
binding principle for the Tholiban Brigade in maintaining the enforcement 
of Islamic law in Tasikmalaya. These two sentences have the consequence 
that every Muslim is obliged to prevent and avoid despicable acts and 
actions that cause loss and collapse of morals, morals, and social life. In this 
case, the Shari'a perda regulates the prevention of the community's 
activities or actions that are despicable and are considered to have a 
significant impact on tyranny. For example, acts of corruption and abuse 
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of office and authority for officials, adultery and prostitution, both sexes 
and homosexuals or lesbians, gambling of various types, alcohol, and food 
containing alcohol that is addictive and intoxicating, use of narcotics, 
substances. Addiction and other illegal drugs, abortion, pornography, usury 
and bondage practices, shamanism due to shirk, thuggery, and deviant sects 
spread. Besides, this regional regulation also contains methods and norms 
of dress following Islamic teachings and social norms of the Tasikmalaya 
people (Tasikmalaya City Government Archives on Islamic Sharia Regional 
Regulation Chapter 2 Article 5).  
Table 1. 
List of Islamic Sharia Rules in Tasikmalaya 
No Islamic Sharia Rules Year 
1 Perda Kab. Tasikmalaya No. 28/2000 tentang Perubahan 
Pertama Perda No. 1/2000 tentang Pemberantasan Pelacuran 
2000 
2 Surat Edaran Bupati Tasikmalaya No. 451/SE/04/Sos/2001 
tentang Upaya Peningkatan Kualitas Keimanan dan Ketaqwaan. 
2001 
3 Perda Kab. Tasikmalaya No. 3/2001 tentang Pemulihan 
Keamanan dan Ketertiban yang Berdasarkan lepada Ajaran 
Moral, Agama, Etika, dan Nilai-Nilai Budaya Daerah 
2001 
4 Keputusan Bupati Tasikmalaya No. 421.2/Kep. 326 A/ 
Sos/2001 tentang Persyaratan Memasuki Sekolah Dasar (SD), 
Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) dan Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama 
(SLTP) dan Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) di Kabupaten 
Tasikmalaya 
2001 
5 Himbauan Bupati Tasikmalaya No. 556.3/SP/03/Sos/2001 
tentang Pengelolaan Pengunjung Kolam Renang. 
2001 
6 Perda No. 13/2003 tentang Revisi Renstra Kab. Tasikmalaya 
(Memuat Visi Religius Islami) 
2003 
7 Perda No. 5/2004 tentang Pengendalian dan Pengawasan 
Minuman Keras 
2004 
Source: Observation, 2014 
In socio-historical terms, the implementation of Islamic syari'at in 
Tasikmalaya has been started since the 2000s. This movement was initially 
carried out by Islamic groups in the community, including students and 
local Islamic organizations, which later joined the Islamic Youth Youth 
Forum (FBPI). Furthermore, this forum was developed through regional 
government channels. However, not all young Tasikmalayas support the 
formalization of Islamic Sharia. Because, after all, the people of 
Tasikmalaya have a relatively high level of heterogeneity. If it is analyzed 
from Islamic religious education institutions, especially pesantren, it is 
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dominated by pesantren with a background in Islamic mass organizations 
such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and Islamic Unity (Nasyir, 
2013). 
Until now, the implementation of Islamic Sharia is still under debate. 
Some community groups support the formalization of the implementation 
of Islamic law, and most others reject it. Objectively, the discussion and 
implementation of the formalization of Islamic law into the positive law of 
the state has stalled, so that the main objectives of the formulation of this 
regional regulation are not yet following what is expected (Mubarak & 
Halimatusya'diah, 2014: 219) 
The support of Islamic parties in the DPRD is strong. It refers to the 
votes acquired by political parties that are seen as committing the Tholiban 
Brigade, where the 2009 election results placed 22 members of the council. 
Meanwhile, community support can be seen from the existence of Islamic 
educational institutions such as Islamic boarding schools that support 
community disease eradication activities, such as the eradication of 
gambling, sweeping alcohol and commercial sex workers (CSWs), cleaning 
of dimly lit stalls which are predominantly used as places of adultery and 
prostitution, and other dakwah activities oriented towards the anti-
immorality movement. 
It was confirmed by one of the informants (E, interview, 20 March 
2013) who stated that eradicating immoral behavior and acts were carried 
out in various ways, such as the imposition of a curfew for women basis 
for maintaining honor and avoiding madness. Besides, the closing of rice 
stalls in the month of Ramadan is a form of respect for the majority of 
Muslims who are carrying out the Shaum Ramadan worship. According to 
him, this was done to maintain the image of Tasikmalaya as a city of santri 
and the place where Islamic boarding schools in West Java bloom. 
Based on the author's analysis, the idea of implementing Islamic 
Sharia regional regulations was initiated and carried out by "hardline" 
Islamic groups. According to the informant (AS, interview 2 September 
2013), this radical group believes that efforts to regulate social life must 
come from the Koran and the Sunnah because both are the Islamic law's 
normative sources that serve as guidelines and guidelines for human life. In 
it already contained complete rules with all its obligations. There is a need 
to implement the rules in al-Quran and as-sunnah. If they do not want to 
accept Allah and His Messenger's rules, then in their view, it will make 
someone an infidel. 
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Continuous action and pressure to prevent immoral actions are 
considered adequate and can minimize immorality in Tasikmalaya. This 
action was carried out in the form of a joint Islamic group consisting of 
several elements of society, Islamic students and youth, including the 
Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Tholiban Brigade, the Community Care 
Movement (GPI), the Tasikmalaya City Forum, the Street Children 
Association (Gaza), Paseh Forum, and Forum Pataruman. Based on 
observations, the movement initiated by the Tholiban Brigade received 
appreciation from both the community and the local government. 
Maintaining Tasikmalaya as a city of santri appears to be a useful 
propaganda strategy to strengthen the movement's vision in efforts to 
uphold Islamic law, both in the context of social rules and through formal 
juridical strategies in the form of regional sharia regulations and other 
regulations. 
In the context of religion, the movement to enforce Islamic law in 
Tasikmalaya can be seen as a religious movement that involves religious 
elements, including belief systems, symbols, organizations, and religious 
practices. The aspect of belief and orientation of a religious movement is 
an inseparable dimension from its initiators who have basic ideas. It became 
natural because historically geopolitically, the Priangan Timur area in 1948 
was known as the center of religious movements and political movements. 
It can be seen by the evidence of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) by 
Sekarmaji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo as its imam. 
The religious movement carried out by the Tholiban Brigade was 
seen as not just a thought movement but also a movement carried out 
through actions and demands both on the government and on the 
community to obey Islamic teachings. In a sociological framework, 
religious movements are part of social action, which contains aspects of a 
world view (worldview). This world view affects the views and subjective 
meanings of the lives of the perpetrators. In other words, these actions are 
seen as meaningful actions and not merely accidental actions. In this case, 
Marx Weber places the world view of Islam as a specific or unique belief 
system because Islam has presented a new religious orientation that 
involves a comprehensive theological system and ethical teachings 
(Scoedher, 2002: 83). 
Islam is not limited to dogma and ritual, but at the same time, it is a 
way of life that provides direction for patterns of behavior and guidelines 
for actions for its people. Islamic teachings regarding da'wah and jihad, for 
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example, these two concepts gave birth to a strong work ethic and militancy 
of the movement among Muslims. Therefore, Islam is believed by its 
adherents to be a perfect religion (kaffah), holy (fitrah), and 
multidimensional with the orientation of human life, both in this world and 
in the afterlife. In this case, the social facts regarding Islam's concept as a 
religion, doctrine, and civilization can be seen from three interconnected 
levels. Namely, First, Islam as a belief system; Second, Islam as a culture 
and way of life that will integrate Muslim life into a country; Third, Islam 
as a political ideology whose value can socialize Muslims into separate 
political communities (Nasyir, 2013: 120). 
In a relationship like this, according to Haidar Nasyir (2013), Islam is 
not limited to an aspect of belief but is in the form of an ideology and 
culture that gives birth to a lifestyle for the behavior (mode for action) or 
the action system of its adherents. This action system is manifested through 
its adherents' religious experiences so that it becomes a cultural structure 
with religious characteristics. Islam is present as a religion that gives birth 
to the construction of a world view and the Islamic movement's orientation 
(Islamic movement) of different styles. However, historically, Islamic 
religious thought and movements' roots refer to the development and 
construction of early thoughts and movements during the Umayah and 
Abasiyah caliphates. 
The NII movement in Indonesia, for example, was often categorized 
as an Islamic “right” movement in the New Order era. The emergence of 
the NII movement was often confronted as an opponent of leftist 
movements such as the PKI. NII is a political movement because of its 
efforts to create an Islamic State. NII made Islam the basis and ideological 
value of its movement. The spread of Islam, both colossally and 
institutionally, such as pesantren institutions, is the most effective medium 
in instilling the NII version of Islamic values. The Tholiban Brigades are 
often associated with the wing right of NII expatriates in the past. 
Based on the interview results, there are several arguments related to 
the transformation of the Tholiban Brigade missionary movement oriented 
to political movements. It is seen as a da'wah strategy inherited as well as a 
damanatari KH. Khoer Affandi (leader and founder of the Miftahul Huda 
Islamic Boarding School) was then followed by his son (Asep Maushul). 
According to one informant (KK, interview April 2013) are as follows:  
“…lamun hayang ngarubah situasi masyarakat moal bisa ngan saukur 
gogorowokan, nitah kitu nitah kieu hese didengena, ajengan dua jam pidato oge 
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moal bisa ngarubah, sabab inkonstitusional. Tah ayeunamah supaya bisa 
ngarubah secara konstitusional, sok arasup jadi anggota dewan kana partai 
numana oge, sabab lamun tos jadi anggota dewan mah boga kakawasaan.” (If 
you want to change society's situation, you cannot just give a lecture, 
two hours of the lecture will also not work because it is outside the 
rules. Now, to change that society, the santri alumni must join the 
council using any party vehicle to have power). 
The statement above shows the importance of power and politics to 
serve as a medium for da'wah. The transformation of the Tholiban Brigade 
da'wah movement in Indonesian local politics is seen as an attempt to 
narrate the spirit of Islamic da'wah in strategic spaces of the state. In the 
end, this political da'wah movement is oriented towards the formulation of 
rules that strengthen the process of upholding Islamic law, especially in 
Tasikmalaya. 
In practice, the Tholiban Brigade carried out this movement to 
educate the Muslim community with Islamic preaching. Ta'lim activities are 
carried out to convey an ideology that is following the Koran and as-
sunnah. According to the informants, if the community already 
understands and realizes that the correct ideology is based on tauhid. So by 
itself, it will facilitate the path to the formation of an Islamic state with 
formal juridical sovereignty and legality. Thus, the NII movement's 
ideology has a significant influence on the realization of several religious 
movements in Indonesia, one of which is the Tholiban Brigade movement. 
One of the steps in building an ideology towards politics, the 
Tholiban Tasikmalaya Brigade, is to press the government to enforce 
Islamic Sharia. According to the informants, there are two ways or patterns 
to win Shari'at Islam's establishment in Indonesia. The first pattern uses 
faith, hijrah, and jihad. Second, the pattern championed by Muslims who 
want Islam as sharia in Indonesia through the participation of the 
democratic system under the umbrella of the Republic of Indonesia. It is 
just that the second pattern is the last option because, in their view, forming 
an Islamic state on top of a Pancasila state is tantamount to talbisul haqa 
bil batil (mixing right with wrong mixtures). The roots and stems are 
Pancasila, while the leaves and fruits are Islam, this is not possible because 
it contradicts the Islamic belief based on Laailaha Illallah. 
He emphasized that it was not the NII that encouraged the birth of 
Islamic Sharia in Tasikmalaya. NII is just an inspiration that led to the birth 
of the Tholiban Brigade movement. 
Dadang Kuswana 
252 Ilmu Dakwah: Academic Journal for Homiletic Studies  14(2) (2020) 231-258 
 
"It is better if we cooperate with mutual respect, religious tolerance, 
but we are one camp. You worship Allah, and we respect you. We worship 
your idols; do not disturb or insult our idols. So Allah answered with the 
derivation of the letter Al-Kafirun. If we agree with religious tolerance, it 
means that we worship them together. We tolerate not getting there until 
lakum is punished by waliyadin (for your religion and religion). 
From the above statement, it can be illustrated that NII will not ask 
for Islamic Sharia implementation. However, the establishment of Islamic 
Syaria'at needs to be fought for following the NII's pattern of struggle, 
namely Iman, Hijrah, and Jihad. 
According to the informant (R, interview, 8 November 2013), the 
concept of tolerance in the NII movement is an effort to provide freedom 
in fighting for the movement's values and mission. By adapting the phrase 
Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo (SMK) to Soekarno. The informant stated 
that SMK translated the concept of Islamic tolerance to Soekarno with the 
following sentence, "For you, Soekarno is your Pancasila and for me the 
Islamic rules that I adhere to. Please fight for nationalism with your 
Pancasila and we will continue to fight for my Islam". The informant 
further explained that:  
"The concept of tolerance, who wins first, it turns out that today 
Allah wants to win the Pancasila camp, (the Nationalism stronghold). 
Nevertheless, we believe history is still and continues to go on and 
insha'Allah. God promises that Islam in the last days with the 
Prophet said will win before the world's end. According to the 
Vatican in his book states: a Muslim who does not believe that Islam 
will win at the end of time is questioned about his Islam and faith. 
Indonesia's ideological struggle will not stop because if an ideology 
is ingrained and ingrained in a person's soul, whatever ideology will 
never disappear unless that person dies. However, his ideology will 
still live and continue because the ideology he adheres to believes is 
true." 
The Tholiban Brigade has a fundamental reason as other Muslims 
who understand the actual teachings of Islam, that, first, Islam is the 
rabbinical religion of Allah's religion which is not intervened by anyone; 
second, Islam is a natural (natural) religion that is not limited by territory 
for all corners of the world and all humans. Then he said that third, Islam 
is a religion of descent (flexible) in every situation. Islam has rules about 
how when Rosululllah saw in Mecca not yet had a strong daub, but Islamic 
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principles already exist how to carry out leadership and manage leadership 
in times of weakness, war, and success. Islam Summuliyah religion 
(universal religion) covers all aspects of life. 
The Tholiban Brigade strongly believes that Islam is the only 
teaching that is guaranteed to be true. Islam will be a pillar and ideology 
that grows in the archipelago to regulate the nation's life and state. For 
them, it is possible to replace the Pancasila ideology with Islamic Sharia 
values. In his narrative, one of the informants stated that:  
"Yes ... if you have won who will doubt, like, if we have died seeing 
heaven and hell who will not believe, everything will be faith, 
precisely the test of faith today before we see heaven and hell; 
moreover we are sure of heaven's existence. And hell. Today, Islam 
has not won; that is Allah's test, whether people claim to be believers 
or not. Those who believe in the truth of Islam will continue to fight 
for the upholding of a rule of life as nation and state". 
The NII (Tholiban Brigade) carried out the da'wah movement, how 
its form can be known based on its objectives. The Islamic da'wah 
movement carried out by the Tholiban Brigade aims to achieve Daulah 
Islamiyah. For BT, Daulah Islamiyyah is a missionary target that must be 
achieved to ensure the enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia. Therefore, 
the transformation of the Tholiban Brigade dakwah movement began to 
be carried out in the political field to create an order of community life that 
implements Islamic rules and values in various aspects of life. The Islamic 
da'wah movement can be enforced by upholding Daulah Islamiyah 
(Kuswana, 2020: 325). 
Regarding Daulah Islamiyyah, several da'wah strategies and stages 
carried out by the Tholiban Brigade are as follows; First, a personal 
approach through an invitation to convert to Islam while at the same time 
implementing Islamic teachings thoroughly. It refers to the concept of 
da'wah Rasulullah Saw, which invites in the way of wisdom and mauidzah 
hasanah. For the Tholiban Brigade, the realization of Daulah Islamiyyah 
must start from the manifestation of Muslim individuals. It is done through 
cultivating aqidah, fostering worship, and caring for muamalah among 
Muslim believers. Second, the invitation to jihad is fisabilillah. It refers to 
efforts to Islamize all components of the Muslim community completely. 
Islam is not a compelling religion, but calls and invites to continue to live 
up to Islamic values in various human life dimensions. Third, consolidation 
between Islamic countries in the world. It is an effort to strengthen the 
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vision, mission, and objectives for the establishment of Daulah Islamiyyah. 
Where must stand on the same territory and be led by a leader who is 
believed? This consolidation was carried out without any time limitation, 
given that in their view, the manifestation of Daulah Islamiyyah was a vision 
of lifelong da'wah tied to the spirit of Amar maruf nahi munkar. 
Religion and state are two entities in a social system that are 
complementary to each other. Both of them can reinforce each other and 
have the potential to become instruments that can lead to the disintegration 
of society. Religion can be a force in building state solidarity. Conversely, 
religion can also be a trigger for conflict. In religion, da'wah and politics are 
two essential aspects that cannot be separated to improve the people. The 
role of da'wah is in strengthening the understanding of the people through 
taklim, tarbiyah, tabligh, etc. It is an attempt to answer the role of da'i. At 
the same time, politics' role is to improve the ummah from the system and 
rules of formal legalization of state law. It strengthens the role of humans 
as khalifah fil-ard (Razzaq, 2014: 6). Therefore, the Tholiban Brigade was 
transformed into the political sphere to strengthen its preaching goals. 
In this regard, there are at least three positions in the relationship 
between religion and state. First, Islam is seen as a religion and a state (din 
was daulah). Where the orientation requires an Islamic state and Islamic 
government (an-nizam al-Islami). Second, the view which states that Islam 
is only a religion, not a state. This view states that religion must be separated 
from the state, and the state must not interfere in religious matters. Third, 
the view states that Islam is the essence that underlies the values and 
universality of human life (Fikri, 2014: 58). It seems that the transformation 
of the Tholiban Brigade da'wah movement into spaces of power can be 
seen as an attempt to unite Islam as a religion and state. The ideals of daulah 
Islamiyyah inspired by the NII movement's ideology show the importance 
of political preaching carried out by the Tholiban Brigade. It is done as an 
effort to build an Islamic community order in various aspects of life. 
CONCLUSION 
Referring to the explanation regarding the transformation of the Tholiban 
Brigade social movement, it can be concluded as follows: first, the socio-
religious movement was initially a response to the phenomenon of social 
change that developed in society. Changes in lifestyle that are against 
Islamic ethics. The trigger for this group's existence is to provide education 
about the dangers of immorality within the framework of building an 
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Islamic society. The Tholiban Brigade (BT) group emerged with a 
missionary strategy seen as extreme and radical. The pattern of the da'wah 
movement is carried out through actions and actions that demand the 
application of Islamic law within the scope of national and state life. Thus, 
the development of this da'wah movement is transformed within the scope 
of power or politics with the hope that the BT group will receive legal 
guarantees and formal juridical arguments in carrying out its da'wah 
movement so that it is not considered to violate religious rules, social 
norms to the political aspect. 
Second, being aware of the limited role in achieving the Amar maruf 
nahi munkar movement targets, the Tholiban Brigade widened its approach 
through practical politics. However, the practical politics of the Tholiban 
Brigade was only limited to carrying out its cadres or prospective leaders to 
become policymakers both at the central and regional levels. It is done to 
strengthen the mission of their da'wah movement. The Tholiban Brigade 
demanded that local regulations be made related to Islamic law. Third, the 
BT ideology is the embodiment of Islamic teachings that are 
comprehensive (kaffah). Socio-historically, the Tholiban Brigade 
movement motif was inspired by the spirit of the Daulah Islamiyyah 
movement. So that in the process of fostering and forming it, the Tholiban 
Brigade began to explore the foundation of the movement and 
understanding of Islam, both during the time of the prophet Muhammad 
Saw and digging the roots of the movement during the DI / TII era in West 
Java. 
Fourth, the transformation of the Tholiban Brigade dakwah and 
political movements was dynamic. This dynamic occurs because of internal 
friction and rejection from the community. The rejection was more due to 
issues related to the formalization of Islam. In practical terms, the 
community supports the anti-evil movement and immorality carried out by 
the Tholiban Brigade. However, some people disagreed with the way and 
approach of the Tholiban Brigade in carrying out these actions. On this 
basis, the ups and downs of the Tholiban Brigade da'wah movement have 
implications for the people's life order in Tasikmalaya. The Tholiban 
Brigade emerged as an Islamic community organization oriented towards 
the manifestation of Amar maruf nahi munkar. This embodiment is seen 
as a da'wah target that must change the Tasikmalaya and Indonesian people 
in individual and communal spheres. 
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